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The Hospital: Still the Doctors’
Workplace(s)—ACautionary Note for
Approaches to Safety and Value
Improvement
Medicare has long stood at the center of efforts to embrace value payment,
enhance quality, and improve the health of the population. Implementation
efforts within Medicare have often focused on the hospital. Hospitals may
seem at first glance to be appropriate places on which to focus. They are iconic
elements of the health care system. They are prominent—frequently the lar-
gest employer in any community, often a source of community pride. They
are familiar—whether people come as patients or visitors, frequenting the hos-
pital is a common experience. People who work there include doctors, nurses,
pharmacists, and other health care workers, many of whom are notable mem-
bers of the community. Hospitals are often taken to symbolize (and indeed, to
operationalize) the powers of modern medicine. Most people are born in hos-
pitals, and many die there. Finally, for those hoping to change the health care
system, whether by implementing new payment policies, enhancing quality/
safety, or creating new public policy models, hospitals represent a manageable
number of “targets.”
The study by Shahian et al. explores an important concept: What is
the relationship between global hospital safety indicators and specific hospi-
tal-level clinical outcomes? The authors made use of the AHRQ Hospital
Survey on Patient Safety Culture and a condition with measurable and
important clinical outcomes—risk-adjusted acute myocardial infarction
(AMI) mortality in Medicare patients. Their methods were solid, their
results disappointing—they were unable to demonstrate an association
between a hospital’s safety culture and its associated AMI mortality.





A fundamental methodologic concern is the organizing unit of analysis, the
hospital.
Are hospitals really the best place to focus our efforts? Perhaps not.
While modern hospitals may on first glance appear to be effective and unify-
ing conduits through which to implement fundamental health care change,
they are in some important ways ill suited for that role. What it means to be a
U.S. “hospital” has been constantly changing and has always reflected a speci-
fic set of social, political, and economic circumstances. Throughout the nine-
teenth century, most hospitals were small houses for the sick and dependent.
They were managed by one person, the hospital superintendent, who was
responsible for both the operation and the culture of the entire institution.
Thus, the levers of institutional change were in the hands of a single person
and were easy to identify. On the other hand, hospitals were irrelevant to med-
ical care for most people. Physicians could spend their entire career without
ever having seen a hospital, much less set foot in one (Rosenberg 1995).
Around the turn of the twentieth century the fundamental nature of the
hospital started to change. Hospitals grew larger, incorporated more technol-
ogy, and became a more integral part of the medical system for both providers
and middle-class patients. Much as the factories they often were designed to
emulate, they started to incorporate an explicit organizational structure. Dif-
ferent departments were created (dietetics, accounting, nursing), each with its
own leadership, enhancing management of the increasingly complex institu-
tion but making the idea of a single hospital culture problematic. On the other
hand, the physician workforce remained relatively undifferentiated. Most
care, from birth to death, was provided by general practitioners; specialty
training and board certification were distinctly uncommon before the Second
World War (Stevens 1998). It might have made sense to think about each hos-
pital’s physicians as having a specific culture.
But after the SecondWorldWar, the reality of a single “hospital” became
harder and harder to maintain. No longer unified in their generalist practice,
physicians became increasingly defined by specialty. Not only physicians but
also the very hospital started to differentiate, to create increasingly separate
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physical spaces in which to deliver care (Sloane and Sloane 2003; Adams
2008). Space was set aside for complex diagnostic equipment, for intensive
care units (once one, now a multitude), emergency rooms, pediatrics wards,
and much else. In our modern hospital, pediatricians almost never enter the
ophthalmology suite, internists do not operate the CT machines (despite the
impression given on the House, MD television show), emergency physicians
do not often wander up to the intensive care units, and psychiatrists are rarely
found in the operating rooms. The early-twenty-first-century institution com-
prises a multitude of “hospitals”within the physical monolith. But the singular
name of the larger institution still echoes its origins. Even when administra-
tively split into different operating units, or spread over several buildings built
in widely separate decades—those buildings are sometime contiguous, some-
times not—we still refer to a singular “hospital.” We do this despite being
aware that hospitals are amalgams of a multitude of different “workshops”
more than they are a unified corporate entity of the type that many policy
mavens imagine them to be.
Hospitals in fact look much more like a multiproduct firm—the multi-
tude of products just happened to be produced under one (metaphorical) roof
(Barcena-Ruiz and Espinosa 1999). Consider the General Electric Company
(GE). GE creates products in diverse industries: aviation, power, transporta-
tion, lighting, and oil and gas, as well as reaching into health care with medical
devices and pharmaceuticals (to provide only a partial list of what this com-
pany does). In providing a wide range of services, GE is not dissimilar to hos-
pitals and their providers who treat vastly different types of patients in
neurosurgery, psychiatry, pediatrics, and physical medicine and rehabilita-
tion. Just as in industry, each of these products has its own culture, organizing
principles, quality metrics, physicians, and explicit and implicit social norms.
No one would imagine that an outcome metric in the transportation product
line of GE should affect how it is paid for its gas and oil business. Or that the
culture and safety record of its lighting business would affect how well its avia-
tion business functions. But because the components of the hospital multipro-
duct firm share the same location and the same name, it is easy to assume that
there is a level of homogeneity in management and outcomes that one would
not expect in other multiproduct firms.
What problems can result from believing that the hospital is a single,
homogeneous entity that can serve as the “locus of control” for health care
transformation? Several recent efforts with questionable results—more “noise
than signal”—reflect this misunderstanding. Consider Medicare’s Hospital
Readmissions Reduction Program (HRRP), in which roughly half of all
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hospitals are penalized if their risk-adjusted readmission rate is higher than
average for a group of selected medical and surgical conditions (Centers for
Medicare & Medicaid Services 2016). Each condition is reviewed separately
and then a penalty of up to 3% is applied to a hospital’s total Medicare pay-
ment—not only for the specific condition for which the problem was identi-
fied, but across all types of patients. So, if the hospital is the locus of control
and has a quality stamp or management stamp that transcends the multipro-
duct firm construct, the number of hospitals penalized should approximate 50
percent. In fact, with just five conditions assessed, fully 78 percent of our
nation’s hospitals were penalized in fiscal year 2015 (Boccuti and Casillas
2017).
A policy that applies penalties across the entire Medicare line of business
in a hospital based on the outcomes of selected tracer conditions is problem-
atic. The hospital providers caring for patients with an acute myocardial
infarction are different from those caring for patients with pneumonia: the
doctors are different, the nurses are different, the social workers are different,
the physical locations in the hospital are different. Penalizing the entire hospi-
tal for deficiencies in a specific type of disease neither makes sense nor is it
likely to be an effective way of changing behavior.
The same problem arises in assuming that a hospital has a unified safety
culture, and then trying to characterize it by a single outcome in one of the
product lines—for example, mortality after acute myocardial infarction
(Shahian et al. 2018). An attempt to demonstrate an association between an
overall cultural survey and a specific clinical outcome is unlikely to succeed—
and it did not. The notion that a global patient safety profile could logically
extend equally to the multiple products produced in a hospital by different
groups of physicians and other health providers runs counter to the current
division of the hospital into functional units. This same lack of association with
a global safety culture measure was also seen when examining hospital cathe-
ter-associated infections (Meddings et al. 2017).
This is not to say that one could not find an association if one assessed
just the safety culture of the cardiovascular product line and related its culture
to mortality from acute myocardial infarction—it is just that the culture in
pediatrics, psychiatry, or radiology is unlikely to affect myocardial mortality.
We need to move away from global hospital assessments or penalties based on
isolated clinical outcomes.
So, what steps can we take to better understand and align quality/safety
and outcomes with hospital payment? The first step is to assess underlying
hospital cultures and to ask how these cultures vary by hospitals with different
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overarching missions. A major urban teaching hospital with many specialists
and subspecialists may have dozens of important product lines and cultures,
while a rural hospital in which care is largely provided by family medicine
physicians will likely have far fewer, approximating the early hospital culture.
Effective payment/policy interventions must recognize and address these
important organizational and cultural differences.
Another key step in moving payment policy more from volume toward
value is better alignment between hospital-based and physician-based pay-
ment and quality incentives. Some physicians base the bulk of their practice
and payment on hospital-centric services (for example, cardiac surgery); while
others, like psychiatry, are less linked between inpatient processes and subse-
quent patient outcomes. For these hospital-centric product lines, the hospital-
based penalties and quality metrics must necessarily be aligned with the
physician-based penalties and quality metrics. This alignment must be appro-
priately granular at the hospital level to mirror the operational units that
deliver that care. An encouraging development in the focus on physician-
hospital alignment is the new Bundled Payments for Care Improvement
(BPCI) initiative from Medicare where the payment for the professional and
institutional sides are bundled (Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services
2017). This approach will likely lead to more focused outcome measures and
clinical innovation than the current global hospital quality and value initia-
tives.
One other transformative element needs to be noted, and that is the use
of technology to manipulate information. Measurement of quality depends
upon the ability to aggregate and analyze data. Early in the twentieth century
the Boston surgeon Ernest A. Codman attempted to measure surgeons’ qual-
ity (Howell and Ayanian 2016). His concepts were not dissimilar to those we
have today, but his technology was limited to pen and paper. There were limits
on how small one could write and how large one could make the piece of
paper, and Codman soon found himself running up against those physical lim-
its. Later in that century (when the authors of this commentary started their
careers) any attempt to study outcomes meant spending hours and hours pag-
ing through paper charts. Obviously, our powers to gather and to analyze data
are far different today. Those powers could be used to measure quality in ways
that more accurately reflect the practice of medicine by specific groups of peo-
ple than by simply lumping together everything that happens within the walls
of a hospital.
The U.S. hospital was once a small undifferentiated workshop; it has
now become a corporate integrated delivery systemwith multiple overarching
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management systems. The nature of the hospital has changed and will doubt-
less continue to change. We must deal with the hospital as it exists today. If we
are to manage based on a true quality signal rather than on random noise, we
must better align institutional and physician incentives at the level of the unit
of care delivery. Lastly, we must insist that studies assessing hospital quality,
safety, and outcomes also address the multiproduct nature of hospital out-
comes, operations, safety, and quality. We should not be surprised that ana-
lyses or payment strategies that ignore the inherent clinical organizational
structures of today’s hospital, a legacy of its history, fail to yield their desired
effects. Most organizational change requires years of effort. But the first and
most important step toward effecting change is to understand the nature and
culture(s) of the organization you are seeking to change.
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